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The Chapter XI Stay Order
and the Secured Creditor
ROBERT W. WERTH AND FREDERICK R. REED*
During the past few years financially troubled debtors have made
increasing use of chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.' The purpose of a
chapter XI case is to permit a debtor to propose and secure a plan of
arrangement with his unsecured creditors for the settlement, satisfaction,
or extension of his unsecured debts. Although the chapter XI plan of
arrangement cannot deal with the rights of secured creditors,2 a chapter
XI case usually has a significant impact upon secured creditors.
Section 311 of the Bankruptcy Act 3 grants exclusive jurisdiction
to the chapter XI court over the debtor and all the debtor's property
wherever located. As an adjunct to this broad grant of jurisdiction,
section 314 grants the chapter XI court the power to enjoin or stay
during the chapter XI case "the commencement or continuation of any
proceeding to enforce any lien upon the property of a debtor." The
full text of section 314 is as follows:
The Court may, in addition to the relief provided by section I I of this Act
and elsewhere under this chapter, enjoin or stay until final decree the
commencement or continuation of suits other than suits to enforce liens
upon the property of a debtor, and may, upon notice and for cause shown,
enjoin or stay until final decree any act or the commencement or con-
tinuation of any proceeding to enforce any lien upon the property of a
debtor.4
Section 314 thus establishes different criteria for enjoining "lien" and
"non-lien" proceedings. Although the court's injunctive power is dis-
cretionary in both instances, section 314 permits the exercise of such
power in a "lien" proceeding only "upon notice and for cause shown."
Therefore, under section 314 three essential steps are necessary be-
fore the court will enjoin or stay a lien proceeding: (1) the debtor must
move the court for a stay or an injunction against the commencement
or continuation of the action; (2) the court must give notice of this
* Members, Ohio Bar. Mr. Werth is a member of and Mr. Reed is associated with the firm
of Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Columbus, Ohio.
1. The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act governing chapter XI cases are contained in
sections 301 through 399 of that Act. II U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1970).
2. Section 306(1) of the Bankruptcy Act defines an "arrangement" to be "any plan of a
debtor for the settlement, satisfaction, or extension of the time of payment of his unsecured
debts, upon any terms." 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970) (emphasis added). Section 356 of chapter
XI provides that any chapter XI plan must "include provisions modifying or altering the rights
of unsecured creditors generally or of some class of them." 11 U.S.C. § 756 (1970).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 711 (1970). All future references to "sections" refer to sections of the
Bankruptcy Act unless otherwise stated.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1970) (emphasis added).
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motion to the secured creditor; and (3) the debtor must show cause
why the stay should be granted.
On July 1, 1974, rule 11-44 of the Bankruptcy Rules5 took effect,
making automatic the discretionary stay provisions of section 314.
Rule 11-44(a) provides that the filing of a chapter XI petition
shall operate as a stay of the commencement or the continuation of any
court or other proceeding against the debtor, or the enforcement of any
judgment against him, or of any act or the commencement or continua-
tion of any court proceeding to enforce any lien against his property, or
of any court proceeding, except a case pending under Chapter X of the
Act, for the purpose of the rehabilitation of the debtor or the liquidation
of his estate.
As a result of rule 11-44(a), the filing of a chapter XI petition auto-
matically stays the commencement or continuation of any proceeding
or act by a secured creditor to enforce his lien. This article will
analyze the impact of such a stay.6
I. RULE 11-44 AND MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS
A. The Problem
Probably the greatest impact of rule 11-44 is upon mortgage
lenders of the debtor who desire to foreclose their mortgages. Almost
all chapter XI debtors have at least one real property asset encumbered
by a mortgage, and many debtors have several. This is particularly
true of real estate development companies, which are utilizing chapter
XI proceedings with increasing frequency. The debtor who files a
chapter XI case is typically in default on his mortgage payments and
is often already a defendant in a foreclosure proceeding. If the
mortgagee has not filed a foreclosure proceeding prior to the chapter
XI filing, this filing will often convince the mortgagee that a fore-
closure is necessary, especially if the chapter XI debtor-in-possession
retains the rents and profits from the mortgaged premises without
making the mortgage payments.
The rule 11-44 stay order stays both the commencement and the
continuation of a foreclosure proceeding. Therefore, in the absence
of possession by a mortgagee or a receiver7 the impact of a chapter
XI filing upon a mortgagee who has not filed a foreclosure is the same
as upon a mortgagee who has-neither one can proceed further with
the commencement or continuation of the foreclosure proceeding. 8
5. All future references to "rules" refer to Bankruptcy Rules, 11 US.C. app. (Supp, V
1975), unless otherwise stated.
6. Although this article will analyze the effect of a rule 11-44 stay on a secured creditor,
some of the discussion will be equally relevant to chapter X, X11, and X1II proceedings, which
contain rules almost identical to rule 11-44 in rules 10-601, 12-43, and 13-401 respectively.
7. See the discussion relating to a mortgagee in possession, section lI infra.
8. In a straight bankruptcy proceeding it does make a difference whether a mortgagee
[Vol, 38:33
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Since rule 11-44 enjoins any act as well as any proceeding to enforce a
lien, it prevents the mortgagee from exercising other rights it may
have pursuant to its loan documents, such as attempting to enforce
its assignment of rents, or repossessing any personal property the
mortgagee has as additional collateral.
The rule 11-44 stay continues until the case is closed, dismissed,
or converted to a straight bankruptcy case unless the court terminates
or modifies it;9 thus the ability to act quickly and correctly to secure
relief from the stay upon the filing of a chapter XI case is critical to
the position of the mortgagee.10
B. Procedures Established by Rule 11-44
In order to secure relief from the rule 11-44 stay the mortgagee
must file an adversary proceeding pursuant to part VII of the Bank-
ruptcy Rules.11 This proceeding is commenced by filing a complaint
with the chapter XI court.' 2 The court then sets a trial date and issues
a summons and notice of trial. 3  After service of the summons,
complaint, and notice of trial, 14 the debtor has twenty-five days to file
its answer, unless a different time is prescribed by the court.15
Rule 11-44(d) establishes the mechanics of relief from stay:
Upon the filing of a complaint seeking relief from a stay provided by
this rule, the bankruptcy court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-
has commenced a foreclosure prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Rule 601(a), the
straight bankruptcy provision regarding stays against lien enforcement, provides that the filing of a
bankruptcy petition shall operate as a stay of any court proceeding to "enforce a lien against
property in the custody of the bankruptcy court." The phrase "custody of the bankruptcy court"
is crucial to the position of a mortgagee who has already commenced a foreclosure proceeding
before bankruptcy. The Advisory Committee's note to rule 601(a) provides:
Subject to the possible limitation imposed by the second clause of subdivision (a)
[relating to liens obtained within four months of bankruptcy], the stay provided by this
rule does not operate to prevent the continuation of any proceeding or act to enforce
a lien when the creditor has possession at the time of bankruptcy. Thus, a pledgee
may enforce his lien after bankruptcy, see 1 Collier 2.62[3] (1968); and a mortgagee
who has commenced foreclosure proceedings in a state or federal district court before
bankruptcy may continue them notwithstanding the stay, see id. 2.63[l].
9. Rule 11-44(b) provides:
Duration of Stay. Except as it may be deemed annulled under subdivision (c) of this
rule or may be terminated, annulled, modified, or conditioned by the bankruptcy court
under subdivision (d), (e), or (t) of this rule, the stay shall continue until the case is
closed, dismissed, or converted to bankruptcy or the property subject to the lien is,
with the approval of the court, abandoned or transferred.
10. The filing of a chapter XI case does not affect suits against the officers and di-
rectors of the debtor, Teledyne Industries v. Eon Corp., 401 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), or
against a subsidiary of the chapter XI debtor. Knickerbocker Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Fashion
Wear Realty Co. (In re Fashion Wear Realty Co.), 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1365 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
11. Rules 701 through 782 of the Bankruptcy Rules, which include by reference several
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
12. Rule 703.
13. Rule 704(a).
14. Rule 704 contains the service of process provisions.
15. Rule 712(a).
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division (e) of this rule, set the trial for the earliest possible date, and it
shall take precedence over all matters except older matters of the same
character. The court may, for cause shown, terminate, annul, modify
or condition such stay. A party seeking continuation of a stay against
lien enforcement shall show that he is entitled thereto.
The complaint should set forth the reasons why the stay should be
modified or vacated. Since an answer will be filed and admissions
are possible, the complaint should contain detailed allegations con-
cerning the note and mortgage, the existence of default, the unpaid
balance of debt, and other liens on the property. Furthermore, al-
though rule 11-44(d) places the burden of proof on the debtor in an
11-44 adversary proceeding, the creditor must make a prima facie case,
so the complaint should not be too general. A good rule of thumb is
to include the same detail in a complaint to vacate a stay as in a typical
foreclosure complaint.
Since rule 11-44(d) provides that proceedings to secure relief
from a stay take precedence over all other matters, except older 11-44
proceedings, the attorney for a mortgagee should be able to secure
an early trial date.' 6  However, the provision that the debtor has
twenty-five days to answer could cause a delay unless the court orders
a shorter period. Since rule 712(a) expressly permits the court to
prescribe a different time, the mortgagee's attorney should always
attempt to get an earlier answer day in order to obtain the earliest
trial date possible.
The trial on a complaint seeking relief from stay proceeds in the
same manner as any other trial in bankruptcy court, and the Federal
Rules of Evidence apply.1 7  Pretrial discovery procedures similar to
those of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are also available."
16. Rule 11-44(e) provides limited authority for ex parte relief from stay. However, one
of the requirements for ex parte relief is a clear showing that "immediate and irreparable in-
jury, loss, or damage" will result before the adverse party can be h.-ard, which is rarely the ease
in a mortgage foreclosure situation. Rule I1-44(e) provides:
Ex Parte Relief from Stav. Upon the filing of a complaint seeking relief from a stay
against any act or proceeding to enforce a lien or any proceeding commenced for the
purpose of rehabilitation of the debtor or the liquidation of his estate, relief may be
granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party if (I) it clearly appears from
specific facts shown by affidavit or by a verified complaint that immediate and irrepar-
able injury, loss, or damage will result to the plaintiff before the adverse party or his
attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the plaintiff's attorney certifies to the court
in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the notice and the reasons
supporting his claim that notice should not be required. The party obtaining relief
under this subdivision shall give written or oral notice thereof as soon as possible to
the trustee, receiver, or debtor in possession and to the debtor and, in any event, shall
forthwith mail to such person or persons a copy of the order granting relief. On 2
days' notice to the party who obtained relief from a stay provided by this rule without
notice or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse
party may appear and move its reinstatement, and in that event the court shall proceed
to hear and determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.
17. Rule 917.
18. Rules 726 through 737.
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As previously noted, Rule 11-44 shifts the burden of bringing the
stay order issue to the court from the debtor to the creditor and at
trial the creditor must make an initial showing of facts that would
entitle him to relief from the stay.' 9 However, the last sentence of
rule 11-44(d) clearly establishes that the debtor has the overall burden
to show that he is entitled to a continuation of the 11-44 stay.'0
C. Judicial Standards Applied to a Showing of Cause
Rule 11-44(d) provides that "for cause shown" the chapter XI
court may terminate, annul, modify, or condition the rule 11-44 stay.
The central issue in a trial seeking relief from a stay is, therefore,
identical to that in section 314, and its predecessor, section 77B(c)(10)
of the Bankruptcy Act 2'-what constitutes "cause shown" for purposes
of obtaining (under section 314), terminating, modifying, or continu-
ing the stay. The courts have established numerous and sometimes
conflicting guidelines over the years in interpreting section 77B(c)(10),
section 314, and rule 11-44.
One of the better reasoned decisions establishing appropriate
guidelines was one of the first decided under rule 11-44. National
Life Insurance Co. v. Jenifer Mall Corp.22 involved a complaint filed
by a mortgagee to vacate an 11-44 stay to enable the mortgagee to
continue with a foreclosure proceeding. 23 The mortgagee held a
mortgage on a shopping center which was virtually the debtor's only
asset. The court held that there were four relevant guidelines in de-
termining whether a stay order should be vacated:
1. the extent of the debtor's equity in the property in issue;
2. the potential of substantial injury to the secured creditor;
3. the demonstrated need for a stay in reference to the objectives of the
debtor, vis-a-vis his unsecured creditors; and
19. In a nonmortgage foreclosure case the Southern District Court of New York has
held that the creditor has the initial burden to "show cause why continuance of the stay %%ould
cause irreparable damage." First Nat'l Bank v. Overmyer Co. (In re Overmyer Co.). 2
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 992, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). However, "upon such shoming, and un-
der the unambiguous language of the last sentence of Rule 11-44(d). the burden shifts to the
debtor to demonstrate its entitlement to continuation of the stay." Id.
20. Chemical Bank v. American Kitchen Foods, Inc. (In re American Kitchen Foods.
Inc.), 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 715 (D. Me. 1976); Otay Land Co. v. DLB Dev. Corp. (in
re DLB Dev. Corp.), 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1463 (S.D. Cal. 1975); In re Alex Reynolds. I
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 210 (D. Ga. 1974); National Life Ins. Co. v. Jenifer Mall Corp. (In re
Jenifer Mall Corp.), 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 179 (D.D.C. 1974). See also 8 COLLtER ON
BANKRUPTCY 3.20, at 240 (14th ed. 1976).
21. Section 77 B(c)(10) provided in part that the court had power to:
enjoin or stay the commencement or continuation of suits against the debtor until af-
ter final decree; and may, upon notice and for cause shown, enjoin or stay the com-
mencement or continuance of any judicial proceeding to enforce any lien upon the es-
tate until after final decree. 48 Stat. 912 (1934).
22. 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 179 (D.D.C. 1974).
23. Apparently a nonjudicial foreclosure was involved, since a sale was scheduled pur-
suant to a notice of foreclosure sale filed in the office of the recorder of deeds.
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4. whether or not a suitable arrangement can be effected without
altering the rights of the secured creditors.24
Applying these guidelines to the facts before it, the court con-
cluded that the stay order should be vacated. It found that the
debtor had little, if any, equity in the property over the claims of secured
creditors. The demonstrated equity over the amount of the first
mortgage of the plaintiff would be reduced to zero in approximately
five months as a result of accruing interest. The court was concerned
that the debtor's continued economic existence depended upon pos-
session of the shopping center; however, the rental income of this sole
asset was insufficient to pay even the monthly payments to the plaintiff,
let alone to provide funds for a plan of arrangement with unsecured
creditors. In vacating the stay, the court determined that success of a
plan of arrangement with unsecured creditors depended upon im-
proved future business conditions and that there was no justification
for delaying a secured creditor in the hope that the economy would
improve.
The Jenifer Mall court also recognized that a chapter XI plan
of arrangement can affect only the rights of unsecured creditors, and
that a clear showing must be made to continue a stay against a secured
creditor. It has been noted that stronger grounds must be shown for
continuation of a rule 11-44 stay than a stay arising under former
section 77B or under chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, since those
cases can deal with the rights of secured parties.2' This factor has
appeared in decisions both before and after the enactment of rule 11-44.
The Tenth Circuit recognized this in a section 314 decision:
Since, however, only the rights of unsecured creditors of the debtor may
be arranged, . . . the court should not exercise its injunctive powers in
a manner to alter the rights of the secured creditors of the debtor ....
If adequate relief cannot be granted without affecting the rights of secured
creditors, the Bankruptcy Act has provided an adequate remedy in Chap-
ter X and elsewhere in the Act.
26
The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion in another section 314
decision:
One who by his foresight and prudence is a secured creditor. who has a
lien upon property rather than the mere general obligation of a debtor,
deserves, and has, a better legal status than that to which Lance [the
chapter XI debtor] would have us relegate Dewco [the mortgagee] in
this case.27
24. 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 181.
25. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.22, at 256 (14th ed. 1976). A chapter XII real property
arrangement also can affect secured creditors and would be in the same category Is a chapter X,
26. Chaffee County Fluospar Corp. v. Athan. 169 F.2d 448. 450 (10th Cir. 1948).
27. Lance, Inc. v. Dewco Servs., Inc., 422 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1970).
(Vol, 38:33
STAY ORDER
These pre-rule 11-44 rulings emphasizing the need to place the
burden on the debtor because of the very nature of a chapter XI case s
are sound, and the procedural change accomplished by rule 11-44
should not make it easier for the debtor to continue the stay than it
was previously. The function of a chapter XI case is to secure a plan
of arrangement with unsecured creditors, and unless the courts place a
substantial burden on the debtor to show cause why the stay should be
continued, these cases will exceed the scope intended for them by
Congress. 29 Fortunately, the Jenifer Mall case recognized this, and
did not change the substantive law concerning the factors that must
be established to continue a -stay against secured creditors.
Of the factors set forth in Jenifer Mall, probably the most im-
portant one is the extent of the debtor's equity in the mortgaged
premises. The decisions are almost uniform in holding that if the
debtor has no equity in the mortgaged premises, the debtor cannot
establish cause for continuing the stay because the premises would
not produce any proceeds for the debtor or the unsecured creditors. 33
In the one ruling that continued the stay in the absence of a showing
of equity the bankruptcy judge allowed the mortgagee to continue
with its state court foreclosure action so long as it took no final action
therein to secure possession of the mortgaged premises.
3
'
A more difficult issue for the courts has been whether the existence
of debtor's equity is enough to justify continuance of the stay regard-
less of other factors. The obvious argument for continuing the stay
when there is equity is that the equity can be preserved for the benefit
of the debtor and his unsecured creditors. However, this must be
weighed against the harm to the secured creditor. As Jenifer Mall
indicates, not every case in which there is equity is a proper one for
28. See also In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1964); In re Tracy. 194 F.
Supp. 293, 296 (N.D. Cal. 1961) ("If there is to be an arrangement for the primary purpose
of altering the rights of creditors holding debts secured by real property. it must be under the
provision of Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act . . .).
29. Even in a proceeding under former section 77(B). which did permit the plan to af-
fect secured creditors, the debtor had to make a clear sho%;ing that the stay against secured
creditors was necessary. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (hi re Murel
Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935), Judge Learned Hand obsered that "the sta%
so authorized [by section 77B(c)(10)], like any other, lies in the courts discretion: prima facte
the creditor may go on to collect; if his hand is to be held up. the debtor must make a clear
showing."
30. Lance, Inc. v. Dewco Servs., Inc., 422 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1970) (section 314 case):
Silver Gate Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Carlson (li re Victor Builders). 418 F.2d 880 (9th Ciro
1969) (section 314 case); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Co. (hI re Murel Holding
Corp.), 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935) (section 77(B) case); In re Red Carpet Corp.. B%K. L. RE'.
(CCH) 66206 (N.D. Fla. 1976) (rule 11-44 case); Otay Land Co. v. DLB Dcl. Corp. (hn re
DLB Dev. Corp.), I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1463 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (rule 11-44 case); National
Life Ins. Co. v. Jenifer Mall Corp. (li re Jenifer Mall), I BA KR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 179 (DD.C.
1974) (rule 11-44 case).
31. Metropolitan Say. Ass'n v. Johnson (hi re Royal Scot. Ltd.). 2 B%%KtR. CT. Dic.
(CRR) 374 (W.D. Mich. 1976).
1977]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
continuation of the stay order. Most of the decisions that have used
equity as a ground for continuing the stay have combined it with
other grounds,32 although some state that a showing of equity by the
debtor is a complete defense to a rule 11-44 proceeding. The better
rule appears to be that equity alone is not enough to continue the stay
if other factors outweigh it.
In In re Empire Steel Co. 34 the court considered a motion to vacate
a section 314 stay that had been granted ex parte. The Small Business
Administration attempted to vacate the section 314 stay in order to
foreclose its mortgage and the debtor attempted to limit the evidence
on whether the stay should be vacated to the existence of equity in
the property. In rejecting the contention that the existence of equity
was the only relevant issue, the district court held that the "adequacy
or inadequacy of the government's security was only one of the ques-
tions upon which a decision should have been predicated."' 5 Noting
that the case had been pending for one year with no plan having been
filed and that mere speculation concerning a plan should not be
enough to indefinitely stay secured creditors, the district court re-
manded the proceeding to the bankruptcy referee for the purpose of
taking more evidence on criteria other than the debtor's equity.
Since the equity factor in a rule 11-44 proceeding is so important,
the attorney for the mortgagee should be prepared to offer expert
testimony concerning the amount of the secured indebtedness and the
value of the mortgaged premises. Also important, yet often over-
looked,36 is the existence of other liens, including real estate tax liens,
against the mortgaged premises, since such liens reduce the debtor's
32. In re Atchafalaya Workover Contractors. Inc., I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 499 (W). 1,1,
1975) (rule 11-44 case; rehabilitation likely to be successfuli monthly payments to be made to se-
cured creditor; causes of chapter XI were nonrecurring hazard losses); In re Metro Meat
Packing, I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 229 (D. Minn. 1974) (section 314 case. vacating stay would
defeat the arrangement, no harm to secured creditor; economy of community would be bene-
fited); In re Alex Reynolds, I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 210 (D. Ga. 1974) (rule 11-44 case /
substantial harm to estate; adequate protection prescribed for mortgagee); In re Tracy, 194 ,
Supp. 293 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (section 314 case; sale by mortgagee xould disrupt proceeding. no
harm to secured creditor); In re Atlantic Steel Products, 31 F. Supp. 408 (ED.N.Y, 1939)
(section 314 case; very short stay; whole arrangement, which had already been accepted, would
be defeated).
33. Sal Amato, Inc. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank (In re Sal Amato, Inc). I BANKR, Cr. Dte,
(CRR) 954, 955 (D. Conn. 1975) ("[I]f, as alleged, there is substantial equity, it would be a com-
plete defense to the request that the court exercise its discretion in vacating the stay.").
In remanding a section 314 case to the district court the Ninth Circuit stated, in Silver
Gate Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Carlson (In re Victor Builders, Inc.), 418 F.2d 880. 882 (9th Cir.
1969):
If there is such an equity, the referee should permanently enjoin the foreclosure until
final decree. If, on the other hand, there is no equity for the general creditors, the ref-
eree should discharge the temporary restraining order and permit the appellant to pro-
ceed with the non-judicial sale.
34. 228 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1964).
35. Id. at 319.
36. This was recognized in National Life Ins. Co. v. Jenifer Mall Corp. (In re Jenifer
Mall), I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 179 (D.D.C. 1974).
[Vol. 38:33
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equity and the fund that would be available for the unsecured creditors.
In establishing the value of the mortgaged premises the parties should
use testimony of appraisers with respect to the "fair market value"
of the premises. This has been defined by one court as "what an
owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would take for his property
and what a buyer, willing but not compelled to buy, would be willing
to pay for said property."
37
Closely akin to the presence or absence of equity in the mortgaged
premises is the second Jenifer Mall guideline, i.e., the potential of
substantial injury to the mortgagee. Since a mortgagee has bargained
for his secured position, it would be unconstitutional3 8 and manifestly
unjust to enjoin him from foreclosing the mortgage if the delay would
cause him substantial injury. No court has held that the rule 11-44
stay should be continued if the result would be substantial injury to
the secured creditor. Some have held that when there is significant
equity, there will be no harm to the secured creditor since he will
eventually recover his entire debt from the property.39  On the other
hand, if there is no equity the secured creditor will be substantially
injured by continuance of the stay, since the longer he is denied the
right to possession and sale of the mortgaged premises the greater his
losses will be. Courts have refused to continue a stay when a mort-
gagee was suffering losses of one thousand dollars per day in interest
and taxes,40 when the debtor was unable to operate the property and
the mortgagee was being required to advance large sums to keep the
property viable,41 when the debtor had not made any payments to the
mortgagee,42 and when the mortgagee would suffer liquidity problems
if it could not realize upon the mortgaged premises.43
37. Otay Land Co. v. DLB Dev. Corp. (In re DLB Dev. Corp.). I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR)
1463, 1467 (S.D. Cal. 1975). This case also contains a good discussion of uhat factors the
court will consider in determining fair market value.
38. See Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Reorganization
and Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAW. 15 (1974).
39. In re Metro Meat Packing, I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 209 (D. Minn. 1974); In re
Alex Reynolds, I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 210 (D. Ga. 1974); In re Tracy, 194 F. Supp. 293
(N.D. Cal. 1961); In re Atlantic Steel Products, 31 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
40. Otay Land Co. v. DLB Dev. Corp. (In re DLB Dev. Corp.). I B,KR. CT. DEC. (CRR)
1463 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
41. Lance, Inc. v. Dewco Servs., Inc., 422 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1970).
42. C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mt. Corp. (In re Groundhog Mt. Corp.). I B,%.i% .
CT. DEC. (CRR) 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
43. First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Holiday Lodge, Inc. (In re Holiday Lodge, Inc.),
300 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1962). The Seventh Circuit found in this case that the chapter Xl court
does not have jurisdiction to stay foreclosure of property owned by a third party that is leased
to the debtor by a lease subordinate to the mortgage. However, in noting that there were
other reasons why a stay granted by the bankruptcy court should not be continued, the court
suggested an interesting argument for a financial institution mortgagee:
We are not unaware of the natural effect of prolonged interference with a foreclosure
proceeding brought by a savings association, such as appellant in this case. It amounts
to a freezing of assets, while it is in effect, a condition which is not consistent with that
1977]
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As stated earlier, even if there is equity in the mortgaged prem-
ises, the continuation of the stay should not be granted if potential
damage to the secured creditor outweighs the equity factor. For
example, if the property is subject to rapid deterioration, the secured
creditor must be allowed to move quickly to protect its security. This
is especially true with respect to property that the debtor is unable to
maintain. Financially troubled debtors are often unable to provide the
funds necessary to maintain facilities or insure them. Without proper
maintenance or insurance substantial deterioration to the property may
occur, rendering any present equity illusory. Uncompleted projects
are particularly subject to rapid deterioration. Although equity may
exist when the project is completed, the debtor in chapter XI usually
cannot afford to complete; if the project remains uncompleted for
any period of time, significant losses may occur. The mortgagee
should be able to cut its losses by obtaining possession of the mort-
gaged premises in order to complete them and avoid the often
catastrophic losses associated with increasing building costs, escalat-
ing interest, and loss of prospective lessees."
The third Jenifer Mall guideline-the demonstrated need for a
stay in reference to the objectives of the debtor in securing a plan of
arrangement with his unsecured creditors-has often been expressed in
terms of whether the mortgaged premises are essential to a chapter XI
plan. If the plan cannot succeed without use of the mortgaged
premises, courts are reluctant to vacate the stay unless continuing it
will substantially injure the mortgagee.4 5  In In re Tracy,46 the debtor
owned both business premises and a residence. The second lienhold-
er, who had a blanket lien on both properties to secure one debt,
sought to sell the properties pursuant to its security agreement.
47
The debtor petitioned for a section 314 stay of the sale proceeding,
and the bankruptcy referee granted the stay based upon his finding
that there was a substantial equity in the properties and that consum-
degree of liquidity requisite in any financial organization engaged in the acceptance ol
investment of the funds of many members of the public.
Id. at 520.
44. Lifton. Real Estate in Trouble: Lendee's Remedies Need an Overhaul 31 Bl',. L'w.
1927 (1976).
45. "To allow secured creditors to repossess their collateral at this time will eliminate
any possibility of an arrangement. It is my opinion that the advantages of possibly saving the
business for the benefit of unsecured creditors, employees, debtor, and even the community.
far outweigh any possible damage to the secured parties by temporarily staying their rights to
repossess." Metropolitan Say. Ass'n v. Johnson (In re Royal Scot. ltd.). 2 BNKR, Ct. Dt,'
(CRR) 374, 377 (W.D. Mich. 1976). See also In re Metro Meat Packing. Inc.. I BNtmt, Ut.
DEC. (CRR) 229 (D. Minn. 1974): In re Alex Reynolds. I BxxtaR. CT, Dtc, (CRR) 210 (S,D,
Ga. 1974); In re Atlantic Steel Products Corp.. 31 F. Supp. 408 (E,D,N.Y. 1939),
46. 194 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
47. The second lienholder was actually secured by a deed of trust and was apparently
attempting to sell as a result of a power of sale contained in the deed of trust.
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mation of a foreclosure sale would endanger the success of the ar-
rangement. The district court sustained the referee's holding with
respect to the business property because the debtor had substantial
equity and its sale might "disrupt the Chapter XI proceeding."4 8
However, the district court, finding that the residence was separated
from the business by fourteen miles of mountain road, was unable to
see how a sale of the residence would interfere with the debtor's
objectives in securing an arrangement with his unsecured creditors.
Remanding with instructions to the referee to reconsider his order
restraining the sale of the residence, the court stated:
It is difficult for the Court to appreciate how a residence in Twain Harte
can be of such essential necessity to the transaction of business in
Jamestown as to justify the restraining order. If the purpose of the
order was to give Debtor time to sell the residence and pay both his
secured and unsecured creditors, then it would seem to alter the rela-
tive rights and positions of secured and unsecured creditors, and in such
case it would be outside of the proper scope of a chapter XI proceeding.
The annoyance to Debtor of losing his residence is not, in and of
itself, a sufficient disadvantage to the consummation of the arrangement
as to warrant the restraining order. . . .On the basis of the record
now before the Court, it would not appear to be legally objectionable to
permit the sale of the residence under the deed of trust, even if the sale
of the business property may have to be restrained to prevent disruption
of the arrangement. 9
In re Tracy clearly articulated the difference between property
that was essential to the debtor's plan and property that was not es-
sential. However, even when property is essential to the debtor's
plan a stay should not be granted if there is little equity in the property
and very little chance of a successful plan. Of critical importance to
whether a court will grant a stay against property that is essential to
a chapter XI plan is the court's assessment of the likelihood that the
debtor can effectuate a suitable plan. If the prospects for a successful
plan are good, the courts are likely to preserve any asset essential to
the plan unless the secured creditor can show substantial injury.
50
On the other hand, if the only hope for the debtor's plan of arrangement
is a speculative or contingent future development, such as a turn-
around in the economy, the stay should not be continued even if
the property is essential to the plan and there is equity.51 This principle
was articulated in In re Empire Steel Co. as follows:
48. 194 F. Supp. at 296.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Koury v. Dressmaker Fabrics (In re Dressmaker Fabrics). 2 BNNKR. CT. DEC. (CRR)
304, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Sal Amato, Inc. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank (In re Sal Amato). I
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 954, 955 (D. Conn. 1975); In re Atchafalaya Workover Contractors,
Inc., I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 499, 500 (W.D. La. 1975); li re Alex Rqynolds. I BANXR. CT.
DEC. (CRR) 210 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
51. First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Holiday Lodge, Inc. (hi re Holiday Lodge. Inc.).
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It is emphasized that in Chapter XI proceedings 'only the rights of un-
secured creditors of the debtor may be arranged and this without altera-
tion of the status of any other classes of security holders.' If there is no
possibility of submitting a plan except upon the happening of some
future contingency, the basis for any protracted stay simpli does not
exist. Otherwise, secured creditors could be indefinitely delayed, for
almost every debtor hopes that something may happen in the ,future to
relieve his plight and permit him to avoid foreclosure. Chapter XI
would become simply authority for general moratoria against secured
creditors rather than a means to permit appropriate submission, pro-
cessing and consideration of plans of adjustment. The 'status' of se-
cured creditors then unavoidably would be affected, for status depends
not only upon assurance of eventual payment but the right to payment
or enforcement in point of time bearing some relationship to the condi-
tions of the security instruments.
The Referee's consideration of the propriety of the stay was too nar-
row. The adequacy or inadequacy of the government's security was
only one of the questions upon which a decision should have been predi-
cated.52
In addition to the factors set forth in Jenifer Mall as guidelines for
continuing a stay, the courts have developed other relevant criteria
which are usually associated with one or more of the Jenifer Mall
guidelines. Closely related to the factors of harm to the secured
creditor and the prospects for a successful plan is the length of time
the stay has been in effect when the question is decided. If the stay
has been in effect for some time and a plan has not yet been accepted,
the courts are reluctant to permit the debtor to continue the stay."
Courts have refused to continue the stay when the proceeding had
been pending for one year and no plan had been submitted,54 when the
debtor had had the benefit of the stay for ten months yet had no viable
business,55 and when the stay had been in existence for nine months
and the debtor had not moved toward effecting the plan.5 6 If the
debtor is permitted to keep the stay order in effect for any lengthy
time, he in effect forces his secured creditors to finance the chapter XI
case.
300 F.2d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 1962); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re
Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941, 942-43 (2d Cir. 1935); C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog
Mt. Corp. (In re Groundhog Mt. Corp.), I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 923, 925 (S.DN.Y. 1975).
52. 228 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D. Utah 1964) (emphasis added).
53. "No doubt less will be required to hold up the suit for a short time until the debtor
shall have a chance to prepare; much depends upon how long he has had already, and upon
how much more he demands." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Murcl Holding Corp, (Ih re
Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d, 941, 943 (2d Cir. 1935).
54. In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1964).
55. Otay Land Co. v. DLB Dev. Corp. (In re DLB Dev. Corp.), I BANKR. CT. Dr,
(CRR) 1463 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
56. C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mt. Corp. (In re Groundhog Mt. Corp,), I
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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- A final factor courts consider in determining whether to continue
the stay is whether the debtor is making payments to the mortgagee
during the pendency of the chapter XI case. If the debtor is making
payments, he is obviously in a better position to defend a rule 11-44
proceeding57 than if he is not.58  However, the failure to make
mortgage payments standing alone has been held insufficient to justify
vacating the stay.59 The harshness of this rule is sometimes mitigated
by the fact that mortgage payments that have not been paid during a
chapter XI case may be administrative expenses entitled to priority in
payment out of the chapter XI deposit.60
Thus, a number of factors must be considered in determining
whether a rule 11-44 stay should be continued, and one factor is almost
never controlling. Generally, a debtor must at least establish that he
has equity in the property and that there will be no substantial injury
to the mortgagee as a result of the stay. The debtor should also be
required to establish that the property is essential to a successful
plan of arrangement and that the prospects for success of the plan are
good. Since Congress has provided that a chapter XI arrangement
cannot alter or modify the rights of secured creditors, courts must be
careful not to alter or modify these rights by an indefinite continua-
tion of the rule 11-44 stay.
A careful examination of decisions that have granted a continu-
ance of the stay reveal that the courts recognize the need to protect
secured creditors in a chapter XI case, since most of the decisions
impose protective conditions on a continuance. For instance, one
court authorized the issuance of certificates of indebtedness to pay
interest to the secured party during the continuance of the stay,6t
another court ordered monthly payments to be made to the secured
creditor,62 another ordered that a previously filed state court fore-
closure could proceed as long as the mortgagee did not take pos-
session,63 another stated it would continue the 11-44 proceeding with a
careful monitoring of subsequent developments and would grant
57. Koury v. Dressmaker Fabrics (In re Dressmaker Fabrics), 2 BANrR. CT. DEC. (CRR)
304 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (lessee made payments from date of chapter XI filing). Cf. D.H. Over-
myer Co. v. Herzog (In re D.H. Overmyer Co.), 510 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1975) (failure of debtor-
in-possession to make payments primary reason for permitting landlords to terminate leases).
58. C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mt. Corp. (In re Groundhog Mt. Corp.), I
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
59. Metropolitan Say. Ass'n v. Johnson (In re Royal Scot, Ltd.), 2 BANKR. CT. DEC.
(CRR) 374 (W.D. Mich. 1976).
60. C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mt. Corp. (In re Groundhog Mt. Corp.), I BANxR.
CT. DEC. (CRR) 923, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
61. In re Alex Reynolds, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 210 (D. Ga. 1974).
62. In re Atchafalaya Workover Contractors, Inc., I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 499 (W.D.
La. 1975).
63. Metropolitan Say. Ass'n v. Johnson (In re Royal Scot, Ltd.). 2 BANKR. CT. DEC.
(CRR) 374 (W.D. Mich. 1976).
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immediate relief from the stay if the facts were to change," and still
another court conditioned the stay by providing that it should continue
for a short time only.65 Therefore, should the mortgagee's attorney
fail to secure relief from the stay, he should at least be able to secure
adequate safeguards for his client during its continuance.
66
II. THE MORTGAGEE IN POSSESSION
One of the most interesting developments in bankruptcy law
concerns the effect of a chapter XI proceeding upon a mortgagee who
has obtained possession of, but not title to, the mortgaged premises
prior to the filing of the chapter XI case. In Ohio the mortgagee
can obtain possession of the mortgaged premises by the consent of
the mortgagor, 67 or by filing a foreclosure proceeding and securing a
receiver to collect rents and profits pursuant to the normal assign-
ment of rents provision of the mortgage deed or under a separate
assignment of rents instrument.68  Since the typical, financially
troubled mortgagor needs the rental income from the mortgaged
premises, a mortgagee can seldom secure the mortgagor's consent to
become a mortgagee in possession. Therefore, the most common
method of obtaining possession is by filing a foreclosure proceeding
and securing the appointment of a receiver ancillary to such a pro-
ceeding.69
64. In re Alex Reynolds, I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 210 (D. Ga. 1974).
65. In re Metro Meat Packing, I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 229 (D. Minn. 1974).
66. The consequences of violating a rule 11-44 stay are illustrated by In re Fidelity
Mortgage Investors, 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1366 (2d Cir. 1976), in which a group of
mechanic's lien claimants filed an action in federal district court in Mississippi to assure the
priority of their liens two months after the debtor filed its chapter XI petition in New York,
The court affirmed a contempt citation against both the lienholders and their attorneys.
67. Hyde Park Say. & Loan Co. v. Cowles, Ill Ohio App. 343, 168 NE.2d 602 (Hamilton
County 1960).
68. Fidelity Mortgage Co. v. Mahon, 31 Ohio App. 151, 166 N.E. 207 (Cuyahoga County
1929).
69. The Ohio statutes governing the appointment and powers of a receiver are contained
in chapter 2735 of the Ohio Revised Code. Section 2735.01 establishes six types of cases in
which a receiver can be appointed, including
an action by a mortgagee, for the foreclosure of his mortgage and sale of the mortgaged
property, when it appears that the mortgaged property is in danger of being lost,
removed, or materially injured, or that the condition of the mortgage has not been per-
formed, and the property is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2735.01(B) (Page 1953). Under this provision it is not enough for the
mortgagee to establish that the conditions of the mortgage have been broken and that he s
entitled to foreclose; the mortgagee must also show that the mortgaged premises are "probably
insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt." Madigan v. Dollar Bldg. & Loan Co, 49 Ohio
App. 69, 73-74, 195 N.E. 250, 252-53 (Franklin County 1933). However, subdivision (F) of
section 2735.01 also authorizes the appointment of a receiver "[i]n all other cases in which
receivers have been appointed by the usages of equity." It has been held that a mortgagee
can also secure the appointment of a receiver pursuant to that :,ubdivision without the neces-
sity of establishing the criteria of section 2735.01(B), especially where the mortgage specifically
authorizes the appointment of a receiver upon foreclosure. Federal Land Bank v. DeRan, 74
Ohio App. 365, 59 N.E.2d 54 (Sandusky County 1944). See also Hutchinson v. Straub, 64
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There are two separate and distinct problems presented by a
chapter XI case that follows a pending foreclosure of the debtor's
real property in which the mortgagee has obtained possession of the
premises through the appointment of a receiver. First, can the chap-
ter XI court oust the receiver and the mortgagee from possession and
permit the debtor-in-possession or the chapter XI receiver to collect
the rents? Second, does either section 314 or rule 11-44 stay the
continuance of the foreclosure proceeding?
It should initially be noted that a chapter XI case differs from a
chapter X or chapter XII case in its effect upon pending foreclosures.
Chapter X and chapter XII both contain specific provisions that allow
the filing of a petition when a foreclosure receivership proceeding is
pending,70 and provide that a chapter X or chapter XII trustee or
the debtor-in-possession (in a chapter XII proceeding) are vested with
the rights of the foreclosure receiver and have the right to immediate
possession of the property.71 It is, therefore, clear that a chapter X
or XII court can oust a foreclosure receiver or a mortgagee in pos-
session and permit the trustee or debtor-in-possession to collect the
rents and profits.72  It is also clear that the automatic stay provisions
Ohio St. 413, 60 N.E. 602 (1901). Most modem mortgages contain specific provisions allowing
the mortgagee to secure the appointment of a receiver upon the filing of a foreclosure, and
it has been the authors' experience that the trial courts in Ohio will generally appoint a re-
ceiver based upon such contractual provisions without the necessity of establishing the criteria
of section 2735.01(B).
70. With respect to chapter X, section 256 provides:
A petition may be filed under this chapter notwithstanding the pendency of a prior
mortgage foreclosure, equity, or other proceeding in a court of the United States or of
any State in which a receiver or trustee of all or any part of the property of a debtor
has been appointed or for whose appointment an application has been made.
I 1 U.S.C. § 656 (1970).
Chapter XII contains an identical provision in section 506, 11 U.S.C. § 906 (1970). Although
chapter XI does not contain a similar provision, it is clear from the cases discussed in this
article that a chapter XI petition can also be filed even if a foreclosure receivership proceeding
is pending.
71. With respect to chapter X, section 257 provides:
The trustee appointed under this chapter, upon his qualification, or if a debtor is con-
tinued in possession, the debtor, shall become vested with the rights, if any, of such
prior receiver or trustee in such property and with the right to the immediate pos-
session thereof. The trustee or debtor in possession shall also have the right to im-
mediate possession of all property of the debtor in the possession of a trustee under a
trust deed or a mortgagee under a mortgage.
11 U.S.C. § 657 (1970).
Section 507 contains similar provisions with respect to a chapter XII case. !1 U.S.C. § 907
(1970).
72. In the recent case of Charlestown Say. Bank v. Martin (In re Colonial Realty Inv.
Co.), 516 F.2d 154 (Ist Cir. 1975), a mortgagee had obtained possession of certain apartment
complexes owned by the debtors or entities related to the debtors prior to the filing of the
chapter XII case. The debtors applied to the court for an order that the mortgagee be required
to turn over possession of the properties to the debtors. In affirming the order that the properties
be turned over to the debtors the First Circuit relied upon the explicit language of section 507,
and held that said section "must be read to mean what it says, for it is an integral part of the
machinery constructed by Congress in Chapter XII." Id. at 158. In reaching its decision the
court analogized a chapter XII proceeding to a chapter X proceeding and saw no reason to
distinguish between the two as far as the turnover order was concerned. It noted that the
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of chapters X and XII stay the continuance of the foreclosure pro-
ceeding.73
Chapter XI does not contain similar provisions. However, sec-
tion 311 gives the chapter XI court "exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor
and his property, wherever located. 7 4  Does this broad grant of juris-
diction give the chapter XI court the power to oust a previously ap-
pointed state court foreclosure receiver from possession? Or is the
chapter XI court's jurisdiction over a state court foreclosure receiver
limited by section 2a(21) of the straight bankruptcy provisions, which
grants jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court to:
Require receivers or trustees appointed in proceedings not under
this title, assignees for the benefit of creditors, and agents authorized to
take possession of or to liquidate a person's property to deliver the
property in their possession or under their control to the receiver or
trustee appointed under this title or, where an arrangement or a plan
under this title has been confirmed and such property has not prior thereto
been delivered to a receiver or trustee appointed under this title, to de-
liver such property to the debtor or other person entitled to such property
according to the provisions of the arrangement or plan, and in all such
cases to account to the court for the disposition by them of the property
of such bankrupt or debtor: provided, however, That such delivery and
accounting shall not be required, except in proceedings under section
205 and chapters 10 and 12 of this title, if the receiver or trustee was
appointed, the assignment was made, or the agent was authorized more
than four months prior to the date of bankruptcy.7"
If section 2a(21) applies to chapter XI, it would appear that a
chapter XI court cannot oust the receiver from possession and place
collection of the rents and profits in the debtor when the receiver was
appointed more than four months before the chapter XI filing. Sec-
tion 302 provides that the provisions of chapters I to VII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act shall apply to chapter XI proceedings unless they are "in-
courts in chapter X proceedings have consistently conferred summary jurisdiction in the chapter
X court over property in the possession of a mortgagee. See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v.
Kaplan (In re Waltham Watch Co.), 185 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1950); Crystal v. Green Point Say.
Bank (In re Franklin Garden Apts.), 124 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1941). See also In re Riker Delaware
Corp., 385 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1967). The same result would follow if a receiver had been ap-
pointed at the request of a mortgagee. See Charlton v. Munyan (In re Shelburne, Inc,), 102
F.2d 612 (3d Cir. 1939).
73. This was true even before the new Bankruptcy Rules were adopted. In Mongiello
Bros. Coal Corp. v. Houghtaling Properties, Inc., 309 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1962), a mortgage
foreclosure was filed before the chapter X petition and the lower court stayed the fore-
closure upon the approval of the chapter X petition. The mortgagee contended that since the
mortgage lien attached more than four months prior to the chapter X filing, the foreclosure
should not be stayed. The Fifth Circuit rejected this position, thinking it clear that mortgage
foreclosure proceedings are automatically stayed upon the approval of the petition for re-
organization. For a general discussion of the impact of the automatic stay provisions of
chapters X and XII on previously filed foreclosure proceedings, see Countryman, Real Estate
Liens in Business Rehabilitation Cases, 50 Ami. BANKR. L.J. 303 (1976).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 711 (1970).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(21) (1970).
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consistent with or in conflict with"'76 the chapter XI provisions.
The courts that have considered whether section 311's grant of ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the debtor's property is inconsistent with sec-
tion 2a(21) have held that these provisions are not inconsistent, and
that a chapter XI court cannot oust the state court foreclosure re-
ceiver from possession if he was appointed more than four months
before the chapter XI filing.
In 4tlanta Flooring & Insulation Co. v. Oberdorfer Insurance
Agency7 a judgment lien creditor filed a state court action to enforce
its lien, and secured a receiver of the debtor's assets. More than four
months after the appointment of the receiver, the debtor was adjudi-
cated a bankrupt on an involuntary petition. The bankruptcy receiver
applied to the state court for a turnover order with respect to the
debtor's property that was in the possession of the state court receiver,
and upon the state court's refusal to issue it the bankruptcy receiver
applied to the bankruptcy court for the order. The bankruptcy referee
refused to grant the order on the ground that section 2a(21) precluded a
turnover order in a straight bankruptcy if the state court receiver was
appointed more than four months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Thereafter, the bankrupt
filed a chapter XI petition, and the issue of whether the chapter XI
court had any greater power to oust the receiver from possession
than did the bankruptcy court in a straight bankruptcy was presented
to the Fifth Circuit in the companion case of Yoshinuma v. Oberdorfer
Insurance Agency. 78 The debtor argued that since section 311 gave
the chapter XI court exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor's property,
the court had the power to order a turnover of the property in the
hands of the state court receiver. Rejecting the debtor's contention,
the Fifth Circuit held:
It is settled law that where, as here, the state court took jurisdiction to
foreclose a lien and appointed a receiver more than four months before
the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, the power of the bank-
ruptcy court in proceedings under chapter XI is not greater than that of
the court in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings. The filing by the bank-
rupt of his arrangement petition had no more effect to oust the jurisdiction
of the State Court than the filing by his creditors of an involuntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy had.79
The Fourth Circuit followed the reasoning of Yoshinuma in
Stevens v. Carolina Scenic Stages,80 which involved a general state
court receiver that had been appointed approximately twenty-one
76. 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
77. 136 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1943).
78. 136 F.2d 460 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 785 (1943).
79. Id. at 461.
80. 208 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 917 (1954).
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months prior to the filing of the chapter XI petition. The court found
that Congress had made manifest its intention that a chapter X or
chapter XII court be empowered to oust a state court receiver from
possession regardless of when the receiver was appointed, but, without
commenting on section 311, found no such manifestation of intent
with respect to chapter XI. The court suggested that the debtor file
a chapter X case if it wanted to oust the receiver from possession."
Without citing Yoshinuma the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reached
the same conclusion in In re Distillers Factors Corp.82 In that case the
state court had ordered a dissolution of the debtor and appointed a re-
ceiver to liquidate the debtor's assets. Two years after the receiver
was appointed, the debtor filed a chapter XI petition. In refusing to
disturb the possession of the state court receiver, the Third Circuit
held that the power of a chapter XI court is entirely dependent on sec-
tion 2a(21) of the Bankruptcy Act.83  The court did not discuss the
effect of section 311.
Although the foregoing cases did not involve the appointment of a
receiver ancillary to a mortgage foreclosure proceeding, it is clear that
the result would have been the same, as the Sixth Circuit held in
Akron National Bank & Trust Co. v. Freed & Co. 8 4 Notably, most of
the cases that have applied section 2a(21) in chapter XI cases have
not been troubled by the broad jurisdictional grant of exclusive juris-
diction over all of the debtor's property contained in section 311.
One could logically argue that when Congress granted the chapter
XI court "exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and his property, wher-
ever located" it did so to the exclusion of a state court that had pre-
viously appointed a receiver to take possession of the debtor's prop-
erty. Congress did not limit the exclusive jurisdiction of the chapter
XI court to property in the debtor's possession. 6 By making section
2a(21) applicable to chapter XI cases the courts have, at least argu-
ably, rewritten section 311 to provide that the chapter XI court has
exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor's property wherever located,
unless the property has been in the possession of a state court receiver
for more than four months prior to the filing of the chapter XI petition.
Would it not have been more consistent with the rehabilitative pur-
pose of chapter XI and the clear language of section 311 to conclude
81. Id. at 335-36.
82. 187 F.2d 685 (3rd Cir. 1951).
83. Id. at 687.
84. 534 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1976).
85. Most of the cases do not even discuss section 311. A no.able exception is Yoshinuma,
in which the debtor made a section 311 argument. 136 F.2d at 461.
86. It has long been the case in a straight bankruptcy proceeding that the court has
jurisdiction over only that property of the bankrupt which is in his possession at the time of
bankruptcy. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 481 (1940). However, the
straight bankruptcy provisions do not contain a provision similar to section 311.
[Vol. 38:33
STAY ORDER
that section 2a(21) and section 311 are inconsistent, and that section
311 controls by virtue of section 302?
A particularly nonpersuasive reason for applying section 2a(21)
to a chapter XI case but not to a chapter X or XII case is that the chap-
ter X and XII cases require possession of the debtor's property in
the trustee or the debtor-in-possession (chapter 'XIl) in order to ef-
fectuate a reorganization or rehabilitation of the debtor.8 7 In most
chapter XI cases the debtor's ability to control his property is just as
crucial to the success of his plan of arrangement and rehabilitation as
in a chapter X or XII case. The primary purpose of all three chapters
is the rehabilitation of the debtor, and this purpose can best be accom-
plished if the chapter court has control of all of the debtor's property.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument in support of the applica-
tion of section 2a(21) to a chapter XI case but not to chapter X or XII
cases is the exclusion by Congress from chapter XI of the specific pro-
visions contained in chapters X and XII providing that the trustee or
debtor-in-possession shall be entitled to immediate possession of the
debtor's property in the hands of the receiver. Both chapters X and
XII contain, in sections I II and 411 respectively, provisions identical
to section 311 of chapter XI. Therefore, if Congress had intended
sections 111, 311, and 411 to give the chapter XI court control of the
debtor's property in the hands of a state court receiver, it would have
been unnecessary to include specific provisions to that effect in chap-
ter X and XII. By excluding a specific provision from chapter XI the
courts have concluded that Congress intended a chapter XI court to be
bound by the general bankruptcy provision of section 2a(21). In addi-
tion, section 2a(21) expressly excludes chapter X and XII proceedings
from the proviso that receivers do not have to account and deliver
possession to the bankruptcy trustee if appointed more than four
months prior to the date of bankruptcy.
Even if one concedes that Congress did intend chapter X and XII
courts to have greater control over the property of the debtor in the
hands of a state court receiver, Congress must have also intended a
chapter XI court to have more control over such property than a
straight bankruptcy court, since the broad jurisdictional grant of sec-
tion 311 does not have a counterpart in the straight bankruptcy provi-
sions. A recent Sixth Circuit case has adopted an approach that is,
in effect, a compromise between the total control provisions of chap-
ters X and XII and the very minimal control provisions of the straight
bankruptcy chapters. In Akron National Bank & Trust Co. v. Freed
& Co.88 the Bank held a mortgage on certain real estate owned by
87. Stevens v. Carolina Scenic Stages, 208 F.2d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied.
347 U.S. 917 (1954), suggests this reason.
88. 534 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1976).
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the debtor, and filed a foreclosure action in state court in July 1973
to foreclose the mortgage. Ancillary to the foreclosure action the
court appointed a receiver to manage the estate. On November 13,
1974, the date of trial of the foreclosure action, the debtor filed a peti-
tion for an arrangement under chapter XI in United States District
Court. Upon notice of the chapter XI filing the state court suspended
the trial proceedings. Within a few days thereafter the Bank filed a
complaint in the chapter XI court under rule 11-44(d) seeking relief
from the rule 11-44 stay order of the foreclosure proceeding. The
theory of the Bank's complaint was that, under cases such as Yoshi-
numa, the chapter XI court had no jurisdiction to take possession of
the real estate from the state court receiver who had been in posses-
sion for more than four months. Therefore, the Bank contended, the
chapter XI court had no more jurisdiction than a court in a straight
bankruptcy, and lacked jurisdiction over the previously commenced
foreclosure proceeding. The bankruptcy judge concluded that there
was substantial equity in the property, and that under normal rule
11-44 principles the debtor would be entitled to a continuation of the
stay. The judge held, however, that he did lack jurisdiction to con-
tinue the stay since possession of the property by the state court re-
ceiver divested the debtor of the real estate, so that it was no longer
"6property of the debtor" subject to the stay provisions of chapter XI.
On appeal the district court reversed, holding that the Bankruptcy
Court had jurisdiction to continue the rule 11-44 stay. The Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the district court, agreed with the
Fifth Circuit in Yoshinuma that a chapter XI court lacks power to
take possession from a foreclosure receiver appointed more than four
months prior to a chapter XI filing. In agreeing with Yoshinuma,
the Sixth Circuit attributed to the Fifth Circuit a holding that section
311 did not enlarge the power of a chapter XI court beyond the
powers of a straight bankruptcy court. However, the court distin-
guished between the power of a chapter XI court to oust a foreclosure
receiver from possession and the power to enjoin the foreclosure pro-
ceeding. It rejected the Bank's argument that since the chapter XI
court could not control possession of the mortgaged premises it could
not stay the foreclosure proceeding, noting that to hold that a chapter
XI court has no more power than a straight bankruptcy court to stay
a foreclosure proceeding was to ignore the plain language of section
314, which specifically grants stay powers to a chapter XI court "in
addition to" the powers granted to a straight bankruptcy court. The
court also recognized that a chapter XI court "has no power to affect
the claim of a secured creditor, yet it has power to enjoin enforcement
of such claim."'89
89. Id. at 1238.
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The Bank also contended that section 314 was inapplicable be-
cause it refers to stays against the continuation of a suit to enforce a
lien "upon the property of the debtor," and to be "property" of the
debtor it must be in his possession. In rejecting the Bank's argument,
the court did not merely state that the debtor's title to the property was
sufficient to make it his property, as it might have done, but em-
barked upon an analysis of whether the property had equity. It
concluded that the property did have equity above the loan balance,
and that the chapter XI court had jurisdiction over this excess value. 90
Does this imply the converse, that if property has no equity it is not
"property of the debtor" within the meaning of section 314 and rule
11-44? Absent possession by a receiver the issue of whether there is
equity in the mortgaged premises does not affect the fact that it is prop-
erty of the debtor, but is relevant to whether the automatic stay order
of rule 11-44 should be continued or vacated. The Sixth Circuit ap-
parently intended the same result in Freed, since it found that if the
mortgaged premises had no equity9' it would be an abuse of discretion
to continue the stay. The correct interpretation of the Sixth Circuit's
holding is: that the mortgaged real estate was the property of the deb-
tor within the meaning of section 314 and rule 11-44 even though it
was in the possession of a receiver; that section 314 and rule 11-44
grant jurisdiction to the chapter XI court to stay further proceedings in
the foreclosure action involving the mortgaged real estate; and that if,
as a result of a lack of equity in the mortgaged real estate, the stay
would not assist in protecting the debtor's estate, it would be an abuse
of discretion to continue the stay.
Although not specifically addressed by the Sixth Circuit, it follows
from Freed that real property owned by the debtor and in possession
90. Id. at 1239.
91. The court actually used the phrase "equity of redemption,r " which in Ohio refers to the
right of the debtor to redeem the mortgaged premises from a foreclosure proceeding prior to
confirmation by paying the mortgage loan balance and costs to the mortgagee. Oiio REv.
CODE ANN. § 2329.33 (Page 1953). The relevant paragraph of the court's opinion states:
If the encumbered property had no equity of redemption or if enjoining execution
of the lien would not assist in protecting the debtor's estate, it would be an abuse of
discretion for the Bankruptcy Court to continue to stay. That case is not now before us.
Here the Bankruptcy Court may protect an equity value in excess of 5500,000. This
value belongs to the debtor and is properly under the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy
Court, which can enjoin foreclosure to protect that value. It is for this reason that
Congress has given the Bankruptcy Court power to enjoin a foreclosure, regardless
of the stage of the state court proceedings. As Collier points out:
Regardless of who has custody of the debtor's property, the secured creditor is
required to first procure permission of the court to foreclose on his collateral.
(8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 3.22, p. 261).
534 F.2d at 1239.
It appears that the court has used "equity of redemption" and "equity vilue" inter-
changeably, but intends the meaning of both to be "equity value." The basic principle set
forth by Collier is obviously what the court meant to hold, i.e., no matter who has possession
of the debtor's property, the automatic stay of rule 11-44 is effective, and this stay is not in-
consistent with the jurisdiction granted to the bankruptcy court by virtue of section 314.
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of a state court foreclosure receiver is property of the debtor within
the meaning of section 314 and rule 11-44, since if it were not prop-
erty of the debtor those provisions would not apply and the stay would
be improper. If this is pyoperty of the debtor within the meaning of
section 314, why isn't it also property of the debtor within the meaning
of section 311, giving the chapter XI court exclusive jurisdiction
over the property? The Sixth Circuit rejected this theory and fol-
lowed the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits in finding that a chapter
XI court cannot oust a receiver who has been in possession for more
than four months. Thus, the court's compromise between the total
control provisions of chapters X and XII and the minimal control pro-
visions of straight bankruptcy consisted in recognizing that although a
chapter XI court cannot oust the receiver, it can stay the foreclosure
proceeding while the debtor attempts an arrangement with his unsecured
creditors. 9
2
The impact of chapter XI when the receiver has been appointed
within four months prior to the chapter XI filing presents one final
problem. Since section 2a(21) provides that a receiver need not de-
liver possession of the property if he was appointed more than four
months prior to bankruptcy, initially it appears that, the section was
intended to require delivery when the receiver was appointed within
the four-month period. Not so, said the Ninth Circuit in Smith v.
Hill.93 Following a long line of straight bankruptcy cases to the same
effect, 94 the Ninth Circuit held that if the lien arising from the fore-
closure for which the receiver had been appointed antedated the
chapter XI filing by at least four months, and if the validity of the lien
is not otherwise challenged, the receiver appointed within the four-
month period cannot be removed from possession. In other words,
when the appointment of a receiver is ancillary to the foreclosure
of a lien, the relevant inquiry is not when the receiver was appointed
but when the lien was perfected. If a valid lien was perfected more
than four months before the chapter XI filing, a- receiver appointed
ancillary to the foreclosure of the lien cannot be ousted from posses-
sion even if he was appointed within the four-month period. The ob-
vious corollary of Smith is that if the receiver appointed within the
92. The Ninth Circuit also has recognized the distinction b -twcen a chapter XI court's
ability to restrain a lien proceeding under section 314 and its inability to oust a receiver under
section 2a(21). Silver Gate Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Carlson (In re Victor Builders, Inc.), 418
F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1969). For a lower court decision granting a stay of a foreclosure proceeding
even though a state court foreclosure receiver had possession, see In re Kirk Gillett, 256 F. Supp,
1016 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
93. 317 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1963).
94. Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515 (1943); Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931); Murphy v.
Bankers Commercial Corp., 203 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1953); Ross v. Carey (In re Broome), 174
F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1949); Town of Agowanm v. Connors, 159 F.2d 360 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 845 (1947); Busch v. McKey (In re Hillmert), 71 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1934); Simons v. Wells
(In re Maier Brewing Co.), 65 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1933).
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four-month period was not appointed ancillary to a lien foreclosure
but was a general dissolution or liquidation receiver, he could be
ousted from possession because there would be no lien antedating the
four-month period on which to base the receiver's appointment.
Although Smith appears to be the only federal court of appeals de-
cision addressing the issue of the impact of a chapter XI case on a
lien-foreclosure receiver appointed within four months of the chapter
XI filing, a district court has reached the same conclusion 95 and the
decision is consistent with holdings in other circuits that section 2a(21)
applies in chapter XI proceedings. If section 2a(21) does apply in
chapter XI proceedings, the holding of Smith is consistent with the
straight bankruptcy cases holding that section 2a(21) will not operate
to oust a receiver from possession where the receiver was appointed
by a state court within four months of bankruptcy incident to the
enforcement of a valid mortgage lien that predates the four-month pe-
riod.96
Because of the possible impact of a chapter XI filing upon a pre-
viously appointed state court foreclosure receiver, attorneys for mort-
gagees can perform an important service for their clients by filing
95. In In re Econo-Richmond, Inc., 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 935 (E.D. Va. 1976). the
mortgagee took possession of a motel property of the debtor nine days prior to the debtores
filing of a chapter XI petition. The bankruptcy judge noted that unlike chapter X, a chapter XI
proceeding does not affect secured creditors. He also noted that section 257 of chapter X
grants to the trustee the immediate right of possession of the debtor's property that is held by
a mortgagee, while chapter XI contains no such provision. The court concluded:
It would thus appear there was no legislative intent to provide such relief in Chapter XI
where the secured creditor has taken possession under a deed of trust or mortgage %%hich
particularly relates to real estate ...
Counsel for the debtor in possession has contended that Section 2a(15) of Bank-
ruptcy Act, grants this Court the inherent equity power to deprive the creditor of pos-
session of the property. This Court is of the opinion that because the creditor...
was in possession of the property at the time of the filing of the Chapter XI proceed-
ing, said property is not subject to any inherent power of this Court, particularly in
light of the absence of any specific section granting the Court the authority to remove
the creditor from possession of the property and place therein the debtor in this pro-
ceeding.
Id. at 935-36.
The court went on to hold that it did have the power to stay any foreclosure proceeding re-
lating to the property and to require the creditor to account for all money coming into its
hands in the operation of the motel. The bankruptcy court ordered the creditor to file a full
accounting with the court for all receipts and disbursements, and limited the disbursements
to only the operational and maintenance costs of the motel. It specifically ordered that the
creditor not pay itself any debt service or pay any other creditor secured by the property. It
is interesting to note that the court did not require delivery of the property but did require an
accounting in view of the fact that section 2a(21) treats delivery and accounting in the same
manner.
96. See note 94 supra. Even before the adoption of section 2a(21) as part of the Chandler
Act of 1938, the Supreme Court had held in Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931), that i'here a
lien was perfected more than four months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy, the bankruptcy
court is without jurisdiction to stay the creditor's foreclosure proceeding instituted prior to the
bankruptcy. Although that case involved a foreclosure proceeding commenced outside of the
four-month period, the Court did not distinguish between such a proceeding and one commenced
within the four-month period where the lien was perfected for more than four months as of the
date of bankruptcy.
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for foreclosure as soon as possible after default, and by getting a re-
ceiver appointed to collect the rents and profits. If a chapter XI case
ensues, rule 11-44 will stay the foreclosure proceeding, but the
receiver can continue in possession to collect the rents and profits and
to preserve the property for the benefit of the mortgagee. Many state
courts permit the mortgagee to select or suggest a receiver, and in
view of the possible length of chapter XI cases it is to the mortgagee's
advantage to have someone other than the debtor in control. A mat-
ter of a few days can be important, as illustrated by a recent case in
which the obtaining of possession by a mortgagee nine days before
the chapter XI filing was sufficient to oust the debtor from possession
and to retain possession by the mortgagee during the chapter XI case.,)
Obviously, possession by the mortgagee or its receiver during the pen-
dency of the chapter XI case, with the ability to collect the rents and
profits means a much more agreeable situation for the mortgagee if it
can't get immediate relief from the rule 11-44 stay. At the same time
the mortgagee's attorney can pursue a vacation of the rule 11-44 stay
knowing that his client will have the benefit of the rents and can as-
sure preservation of the premises.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE RULE 11-44 STAY ON THE FLOATING LIEN
CREDITOR AND THE DEBTOR'S USE OF COLLATERAL
When the debtor is a manufacturer or retailer98 and the secured
creditor has a perfected security interest in accounts receivable and
inventory, 99 the legal impact of a chapter XI filing is not substantially
different from its impact on the real estate mortgagee-the creditor is
automatically enjoined under rule 11-44 from employing legal pro-
cess or taking any action to enforce his lien.1° The practical impact
on the floating lien creditor, however, may be substantially more
harsh; for this reason, it is in cases dealing primarily with floating
97. In re Econo-Richmond, Inc., 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 935 (E.D. Va. 1976).
98. The debtor need not be a manufacturer or retailer for the following analysis to apply,
but can be any kind of debtor who is likely to have given inventory and accounts receivable as
security. A manufacturing or retailing situation is especially illustrative of the problem encoun-
tered, however, and for that reason is used here.
99. Security interests of this type are hereinafter referred to as "floating liens." The
authorization for their use and the manner in which they attach to the inventory and accounts
of the debtor are more fully discussed below. Secured creditors holding this type of collateral
are hereinafter referred to as "floating lien creditors."
100. This broad injunctive language means that the floating lien creditor is enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with his rights of repossession, collection, or disposition of collateral
pursuant to U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to 9-507 (1972 version) at whatever point he has reached. That is,
if he has repossessed, he cannot sell and so forth. There is, however, an unresolved question
relating to the collection of accounts receivable. U.C.C. § 9-502 (1972 version) states that accounts
receivable collateral may be collected by giving notice to the account debtor to pay the secured
creditor directly. If the imposition of the rule 11-44 stay occurs after this notice is given, the
receipt of payment by the secured creditor does not appear to be an "act" so as to violate the
stay provisions of the rule. Application of collected amounts, however, may be such an act and
would therefore appear to violate the rule.
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lien collateral that the battles over the use of collateral have largely
been fought.101
For a manufacturer or retailer seeking to make an arrangement
with his unsecured creditors it is imperative to the chapter XI plan
that the accounts receivable be used as working capital for the pur-
chase of new inventory and for payment of other operating costs, and
that inventory be sold in the normal course of business for the generation
of new accounts receivable.10 2  To facilitate this obvious need, in
granting the debtor authority to continue the operation of its busi-
ness10 3 a chapter XI court will routinely grant a debtor-in-possession
specific authority to retain and use the collateral that is subject to
the floating lien. Illustrative of the authority commonly given to a
debtor-in-possession upon the filing of a chapter XI petition is that
embodied in the order entered by Bankruptcy Judge Galgay in In re
W. T. Grant Co.,1Y4 authorizing the debtor-in-possession to operate its
business and manage its property. That order stated in relevant part:
101. It is more precise to state that the battles are presently being fought with respect to
the use of collateral The two principal cases dealing with the use of floating lien collateral,
Chemical Bank v. American Kitchen Foods, Inc. (In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc.). 2 BANKIIR.
CT. DEC. (CRR) 715 (D. Me. 1976) and Citicorp Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc.
(In re Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc.), 407 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ohio 1976), are both very recent cases.
Blazon is presently on appeal to the Sixth Circuit, and in American itchen Foods, parts of the
operating orders have been appealed to the district court. With respect to the continuing fight
over use of collateral, Bankruptcy Judge Cyr stated in American Kitchen Foods
The power of the bankruptcy court to authorize retention and use of collateral and
proceeds to fund continuing Chapter XI business operations is under direct challenge.
Although the retention and use of collateral in Chapter XI proceedings can no longer
be considered a frontier, it is yet to be extensively charted. Notwithstanding the fact
that Chapter XI debtors retain and use collateral and proceeds routinely, almost as a
matter of right incident to the pendency of the automatic stay imposed against lien
enforcement by Chapter XI Rule 11-44, there is almost no reported case law on the sub-
ject.
2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 717.
102. With respect to this need, Judge Cyr stated in American Kitchen Foodr.
Were it not for the interposition of legal constraints upon lien enforcement the ubiqui-
tous floating lien could conceivably preempt virtually every attempt at arrangement
proceedings. Continued business operations would be rendered impracticable, just as
in the instant case, due to dispossessions of indispensable collateral, leaving no alter-
native but liquidation with its attendant waste and disruption.
Id. at 718. The second criterion described in Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Jenifer Mall Cqrp. (In re
Jenifer Mall Corp.), 1 BANKR. Cr. DEC. (CRR) 179 (D.D.C. 1974), see text accompanying note
24 supra, is largely presumed in these cases.
103. Bankruptcy Act § 342 states: "Where no receiver or trustee is appointed, the debtor
shall continue in possession of his property and shall have all the title and exercise all the
powers of a trustee appointed under this title. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1970). Section 343 states
that: "IT]he debtor in possession . . . shall have the power, upon authorization by and
subject to the control of the court, to operate the business and manage the property of the deb-
tor. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 743 (1970). These provisions are supplemented by chapter XI, rule 11-18.
In most cases, when the continued operation of the business is critical to the success of the ar-
rangement, an ex parte order granting the debtor-in-possession the right to continue in pos-
session of the property and operate the business, entered pursuant to rule 11-18 and the above
cited sections, is entered by the court on the same day that the chapter XI petition is filed.
104. In re W.T. Grant Co., No. 75-B-1735, (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 2, 1975) (granting operating
order). This order was entered October 2, 1975. Similar authority was granted to the debtor-
in-possession on the filing date in both Citicorp Bus. Credit Corp. v. Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc.
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ORDERED that said debtor-in-possession shall close the present books
of account as of the close of business on the date of entry of this order,
and shall open new books of account as of the opening of business of the
next succeeding business day, in which new books of account shall cause
to be kept proper accounts of its earnings, expenses, receipts, disburse-
ments and all obligations incurred and transactions had in the operation
of the business, and the management, preservation and protection of
the properties of the within estate;
ORDERED that the debtor-in-possession be and it hereby is authorized,
in the operation of its business and until further order of this court, (a)
to sell inventories, merchandise and other tangible personal property
of every kind and description attained by the debtor prior to the filing of
the petition herein and to collect and use the proceeds thereof, in what-
ever form, and (b) to collect and realize upon all accounts, contract rights,
chattel paper, instruments and general intangibles owned by the debtor
at the time of the filing of the petition herein and to use the proceeds
thereof (including any proceeds constituting collateral for any secured
creditor at the time of such filing) in whatever form; . . .10
When the debtor-in-possession is authorized to retain and use
real property collateral, the collateral remains subject to the secured
creditor's mortgage, and ordinarily is not used up in the operation of
the business, nor does it depreciate so quickly that drastic measures are
required to protect the secured party's interest. 10 6  When the security
consists of accounts receivable and inventory, however, unless the
secured creditor obtains a specific grant of a new security interest, his
floating lien is cut off by the chapter XI filing, and his collateral is
subject to complete dissipation by the operation of the business by
the debtor-in-possession. Unless very strict protective measures are
required of the debtor-in-possession to monitor the continuing suffi-
ciency of the floating lien collateral, the floating lien creditor may be
subjected to substantial risks, and his collateral impaired.
Were the floating lien creditor without recourse, and subjected
to either total dissipation of his collateral or other collateral impair-
ment, the court would clearly be exercising an authority not granted
by chapter XI, and would also be violating the constitutional prohibi-
tion against the uncompensated taking of property. 07 To facilitate
(In re Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc.), 407 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ohio 1976) and Chemical Bank v.
American Kitchen Foods, Inc. (In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc.), 2 BANKR. CT. Dtc. (CRR)
715 (D. Me. 1976).
105. In re W.T. Grant Co., No 75-B-1735, (S.D.N.Y., Oct 2, 1975) (granting operating
order).
106. Equipment collateral is basically like real property collateral, in that it is not immedi-
ately used up by the debtor.
107. For discussion of the lack of authority of a chapter XI court to materially and ad-
versely affect the rights of secured creditors, and the constitutionaT oblection to its doing so. see
note 38 supra. It should be noted that the battles over use of floating lien collateral are
presently being waged on precisely these grounds and, as stated by Judge Cyr, the ground has
yet to be "extensively charted." (Blazon and American Kitchen Foods are presently on appeal.
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the purpose of chapter XI, which is to allow the debtor to effect an
arrangement with his unsecured creditors, the courts have fashioned
remedies and safeguards to overcome these prima facie violations of
secured creditors' rights. Since the validity of these safeguards and
remedies has been upheld to date, it is assumed, for purposes of this
discussion, that they are proper. Even after applying these safeguards,
courts must consider whether the secured creditor's rights are "ma-
terially and adversely affected." If so, relief from the rule 11-44 stay
must be granted and the floating lien creditor given the right to
realize on his collateral.
The balance of this discussion describes some of the initial prob-
lems faced by the floating lien creditor, together with the safeguards
and remedies that have been fashioned by the courts to overcome them.
Finally, the standards for determining whether, after application of
the remedies and safeguards, the secured creditor is still materially
and adversely affected so as to require a grant of relief from the rule
11-44 stay order will be examined.
A. Initial Problems and Their Safeguards and Remedies
1. Floating Lien Cut-off.
In the normal floating lien situation inventory is constantly sold
and accounts receivable are collected. The dissipated collateral is
also continually replaced by new inventory and accounts receivable,
which are in turn subjected to the secured creditor's floating lien
pursuant to an "after-acquired property" provision in his security
agreement, as authorized by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code!0 So long as collateral is maintained at an adequate level,
therefore, the secured creditor need not take further action to ensure
that his loan is fully secured. Upon the filing of a chapter XI peti-
tion, however, unless a new lien is granted by the debtor-in-posses-
sion, the floating lien of the secured creditor will be cut off as to
property acquired thereafter, and the floating lien creditor's security
will be dissipated in the operation of the business.
See note 101 supra.) The assumption on which this argument proceeds, as described in the
following text, is subject to confirmation or rejection by the courts. A thorough discussion
of the constitutional and statutory objection is avoided here, because the purpose of this article
is to describe the current state of the law rather than to argue for any particular result.
108. A standard property description will include a description of the collateral which
covers accounts receivable and inventory of the debtor whenever acquired. Authorization for
such a security interest in after-acquired property is found in U.C.C. § 9-204 (1962 version),
which states in relevant part: "(A) security agreement may provide that collateral, whenever
acquired, shall secure all obligations covered by the security agreement." After the enactment
of the Uniform Commercial Code, there was some controversy regarding the validity of a se-
curity interest in after-acquired property against a bankruptcy trustee or trustee entity like a
debtor-in-possession. The question has been largely resolved and the floating liens, if properly
perfected, have withstood attack. An illustrative Ohio case upholding the validity of the float-
ing lien is In re White, 263 F. Supp. 208 (S.D. Ohio 1967). See also U.C.C. § 9-108 (1972
version).
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The floating lien will not apply to inventory and accounts re-
ceivable acquired by the debtor-in-possession after filing of the chapter
XI petition, because the debtor-in-possession is a separate legal entity
from the debtor, a distinction clearly made by the Bankruptcy Act.
The debtor files the chapter XI petition, 10 9 proposes the arrange-
ment,"0 and makes the deposit prior to confirmation."' It is the
debtor-in-possession who may be authorized to operate the business 1 2
and to issue certificates of indebtedness." 3  In In re Sequential In-
formation Systems, Inc.,1 4 then bankruptcy referee Herzog held:
It is perfectly clear, then, that the debtor-in-possession is an entity
separate and distinct from the debtor who filed the Chapter XI petition
and who proposes an arrangement to his creditors. The debtor-in-pos-
session, when authorized to operate the business, is required to open a
new set of books and deposit funds in a "debtor-in-possession" bank
account from which withdrawals are made in the current operation of the
business . . . .
Because the postfiling entity is a separate legal entity from the
prefiling debtor, inventory and accounts receivable acquired by the
postfiling entity, the debtor-in-possession, are not subject to the
security interest of the secured creditor who claims an interest in
after-acquired property of the prefiling debtor."1 6  The 1962 version of
Uniform Commercial Code section 9-204(1) states:
A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement (subsec-
tion (3) of Section 1-201) that it attach and value is given and the debtor
has rights in the collateral. It attaches as soon as all of the events in
the preceding sentence have taken place unless explicit agreement post-
pones the time of attaching." 7
109. Bankruptcy Act §§ 321 & 322, 11 U.S.C. §§ 721 & 722 (1970); rule 11-3.
110. Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1970); rule 11-6.
111. Bankruptcy Act § 337, 11 U.S.C. § 737 (1970); rule 11-39(a).
112. Bankruptcy Act § 343, 11 U.S.C. § 743 (1970); rule 11-23.
113. Bankruptcy Act § 344, 11 U.S.C. § 744 (1970).
114. 4 SEc. TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) 51,479 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
115. Id. at 66,433. In Shopman's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods,, Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d
Cir. 1975), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confirmed this finding by stating: "A
debtor-in-possession under Chapter XI or under Chapter X, a trustee under the latter Chapter,
or a trustee in a straight bankruptcy proceeding is not the same entity as a pre-bankruptcy
company." Id. at 704.
116. It must be recognized that inventory and accounts receivable acquired by the debtor-
in-possession after filing of a chapter XI petition may be proceeds, as that term is defined in
U.C.C. § 9-306 (1972 version), and for that reason may become subject to the security interest
of the creditor of the prefiling entity. Since there will necessarily be some slippage in attempts
to trace proceeds of the prefiling collateral to the assets of the postfiling debtor-in-possession,
and because this slippage becomes greater and greater as the inventory and accounts receivable
continue to turn, the proceeds arguments is ignored for purposes of illustrating this threshold
problem.
117. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1962 version) (emphasis added). The 1972 amendments to the
Uniform Commercial Code, not yet enacted in Ohio, consolidate the provisions of former §§ 9-203
and 9-204. These consolidations make clear that the concept o' attachment of a security in-
terest is related to enforceability. The amendment shows with more clarity than exists under
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Since inventory and accounts receivable obtained by the debtor-in-
possession after filing are assets of that entity except to the extent that
a tracing of proceeds is possible, 118 the prefiling debtor does not obtain
"rights in the collateral" as required by U.C.C. section 9-204."1, With-
out such debtor rights in the collateral the security interest claimed by
the floating lien creditor cannot attach, 20 and without attachment
cannot be perfected.
When an order is entered granting the debtor-in-possession
authority to retain and use inventory and accounts of the debtor, the
debtor-in-possession will, by selling inventory and using the accounts
receivable of the prefiling debtor, dissipate the collateral of the secured
creditor. He will replace that collateral with new inventory and ac-
counts receivable of the debtor-in-possession, free and clear of floating
lien claims. Under rule 11-44 the secured creditor is also enjoined
from initiating or continuing any proceeding, or taking any other act
to realize on his security. Thus, the debtor-in-possession is able to
dissipate the collateral and replace it with similar property not subject
to the floating lien, and the secured creditor is enjoined from pursuing
his remedies to realize on the collateral while it is being dissipated.
Courts faced with this problem of violating the rights of secured
creditors have solved it through the most obvious of expedients: they
have simply required the debtor-in-possession to account for the use
of any floating lien collateral, considered this use a cost of adminis-
tration,1 2 ' and secured that cost of administration to the secured credi-
tor by placing a lien on all property of the debtor-in-possession.1
In Chemical Bank v. American Kitchen Foods, Inc.12 3 the court autho-
rized the debtor to continue using the collateral subject to the floating
lien of the secured creditor; as a condition to this authorization, how-
ever, the court required:
the 1962 version of Article 9, that until a secured creditor's debtor acquires rights in the col-
lateral, the security interest is not enforceable with respect to that collateral, either against
the debtor or third persons.
118. See note 116 supra.
119. See note 117 supra.
120. Id. See also U.C.C. § 9-303 (1972 version), which shows that attachment of the se-
curity interest is a requisite of perfection; that is, a security interest cannot be perfected until
it has attached.
121. Costs of administration are entitled to a first priority in payment from a chapter Xl
estate. See Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(l) (1970). These costs must be
paid in full before any chapter XI plan can be confirmed. See Bankruptcy Act § 337, 11 U.S.C.
§ 737 (1970), and rule 11-38.
122. There are several variants on this theme. For example, some courts have prohibited
use of floating lien collateral until after it has been "purchased" from the secured creditor
with borrowings from that creditor evidenced by certificates of indebtedness issued by the
debtor-in-possession and secured by its assets. These borrowings are also treated as costs of ad-
ministration. The effect is the same regardless of the form these remedies take.
123. 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 715 (D. Me. 1976).
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That to the extent use is made of such assets and proceeds, the
claim of any creditor holding or entitled to the benefit of a valid security
interest therein shall constitute a valid and enforceable secured claim
against the assets of the debtors in possession whether now existing or
hereafter acquired, and shall be entitled to priority and payment as an
expense of administration, secured (subject to valid liens existing at the
time of filing of the petition herein as to which the lien herein granted
has not been substituted) by all property of the debtors in possession,
including but not limited to inventories, merchandise, accounts, contract
rights, chattel paper, instruments, securities, general intangibles, equip-
ment and fixtures, and real property and the proceeds thereof of the
debtors in possession (whether received by it from the debtors or acquired
on or after the date of filing of the petitions herein). 24
By means of such protective orders courts have overcome the initial
problem of collateral dissipation. Having overcome this threshold
problem, these courts have then considered whether the total amount
of collateral subject to the security interest of the floating lien creditor
remains sufficient during the course of a chapter XI proceeding to ade-
quately secure his rights.
25
While the problem of collateral dissipation should be remedied as
a precondition to authorizing the debtor-in-possession to retain and use
floating lien collateral, in at least two unofficially reported bankruptcy
court decisions it appears that no such protective measure was taken
and that the floating lien creditor suffered the kind of dissipation of
collateral described above. 26  As soon as a chapter XI petition is
filed, therefore, the order allowing the debtor-in-possession to operate
the business and to retain and use collateral should be examined by
the attorney for the secured creditor to determine the extent of the
protection given for floating lien collateral. Appropriate remedial
action should obviously be taken if sufficient protection is not in-
cluded. 127
2. Other Detriments to Floating Lien Creditors.
Even if the operating order granting the debtor-in-possession the
right to retain and use floating lien collateral has granted the creditor
124. Id. at 716 n. 4. See also Citicorp Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc.
(In re Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc.), 407 F. Supp. 861, 863 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
125. See text accompanying notes 128-40 infra, for standards used to determine this question,
126. See Ver Halen, Inc. v. Siehr (In re DeGayner Homes, Inc.), I BANKR. CT. Dtc. (CRI)
532 (W.D. Wis. 1975); In re Sequential Info. Systems, Inc., ,4 Swc. TRANS, GtUID (CCII)
51,479.
127. If no protective measures are included for floating lien collateral, it would seem to
be an appropriate case for immediate, and, if necessary, ex parte relief from the rule 11-44 stay,
as authorized by rule 11-44(e). See note 16 supra. A motion to set aside the operating order
which causes the collateral dissipation may also be appropriate. This motion would be made




a new lien on accounts receivable and inventory acquired after the
filing of the petition, the secured creditor is subjected to several other
threshold risks against which he must be protected. For example, the
chapter XI debtor-in-possession may not be replacing the postfiling
inventory and accounts receivable at the rate that it is depleting the
prefiling collateral, thereby cutting into the secured creditor's inter-
ests. Alternatively, the debtor-in-possession may be taking advantage
of the rule 11-44 stay order by not making current payments on the
secured creditor's debt, causing the secured debt to increase through
interest accumulation without adequate collateral protection. 2s To
protect against these risks, the courts have fashioned procedures for
continual monitoring of the effect of the use of collateral on the secured
creditor. The most stringent monitoring requirements imposed to date
are those established by Judge Cyr in Chemical Bank v. American
Kitchen Foods, Inc.1 29  After authorizing the debtor-in-possession to
retain and use all floating lien collateral, he required
that the debtors-in-possession shall report in writing to any creditor
claiming a lien or other security interest in or to any inventory, accounts,
contract rights, chattel paper or proceeds, as to the creation, collection
and disposition of any and all inventory, on a weekly basis, and, mailed on
a daily basis, with respect to accounts receivable, including credits,
freights and discounts with respect thereto. 130
In another section of his order, Judge Cyr provided
that any creditor claiming to be the holder of a security interest af-
fected hereby may commence proceedings in this court on notice to the
debtors-in-possession or such other persons as the court may designate
for the determination of the authorization herein made for the continued
use of all such assets by the debtor-in-possession and for such protective
provisions with respect thereto as the court may deem appropriate.1
3 1
Such continuous monitoring of the use of collateral of floating lien
creditors allows the court to establish and apply criteria for the con-
tinuance of the chapter XI stay against floating lien creditors, and for
128. Similar kinds of impairments may vary from case to case. No exhaustive list is
attempted because the fact situations presented by each case vary, as do the possible impair-
ments that may befall the floating lien creditor. Another example of the type of impairment that
may be presented is the one claimed by the secured creditor in Citicorp Bus. Credit. Inc. v.
Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc. (In re Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc.), 407 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ohio
1976). In Blazon the debtor was a manufacturer of sleds, sold seasonably in the 'inter. and
children's outdoor gym equipment, sold primarily in the spring and summer. The secured
creditor in this case claimed that its collateral was impaired both because of seasonal inven-
tory fluctuations and because the effect of imposing and continuing the rule 11-44 stay was to
change the character of its collateral from one type of inventory to another. See Brief for
Appellant, Citicorp Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc. (In re Blazon Flexible
Flyer, Inc.) (6th Cir., filed June 3, 1976).
129. 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 715 (D. Me. 1976).
130. Id. at 716 n.4.
131. Id.
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the determination of whether the chapter XI debtor should continue to
retain and use the collateral.
B. Relieffrom the Rule 11-44 Stay.
After these initial problems have been remedied or monitored to
the extent possible, the attorney for the secured creditor should ask
the chapter XI court to determine whether the floating lien creditor's
rights are being "materially and adversely affected" so as to require
granting relief from the rule 11-44 stay. Criteria thus far established
by the courts for determining this issue can be gleaned from the few
cases addressing it in the context of floating lien collateral. These
criteria may be stated briefly as follows: (1) Is there a reasonable
possibility that a successful arrangement can be effected? (2) Is the
floating lien creditor's collateral being invaded?
132
The first of these standards, which is also one of the standards
the courts employ in assessing a real property mortgagee's right to a
vacation of the stay, indicates that courts must always consider the
purpose of the chapter XI stay-to effect a successful arrangement-in
determining whether the right of a secured creditor to realize on his
collateral is outweighed by this goal. If the prospects for a successful
arrangement are good, some minimal invasion of the secured creditor's
rights may be allowed. Judge Cyr stated in American Kitchen
Foods:
Without question judicial assessment of the elusive intangibles invari-
ably involved in projecting possible future collateral impairment risk is
an inescapably rude and uncertain process. It is also undeniable that
debtor rehabilitation often would be foreclosed entirely were there an
absolute bar to venturing any collateral erosion whatever.,
33
Application of this standard is, therefore, no different in the floating
lien situation than in the mortgage situation; it is the same standard
applied by the court in Jenifer Mall.134
As to the second criterion, the valuation of floating lien collateral
may be vastly different, depending on whether a "going-concern" or
"forced-sale" standard is used. 3 5  Addressing this question directly,
the court in American Kitchen Foods opted for a "going-concern"
valuation standard. The court analogized to the standard that would
132. These criteria, here stated in more rudimentary form than in the section of this dis-
cussion relating to relief for the mortgage creditor, have a somewhat different application in
the floating lien situation because the valuation problems encountered with this type of col-
lateral are exaggerated. See text accompanying footnotes 135-40, infra.
133. 2 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) 715, 720 (D. Me. 1976).
134. 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 179 (D.D.C. 1974).
135. This necessarily ties the first criterion to the second, since arguably a "going-concern"
valuation standard would be unreasonable on its face without a determination that a successful
arrangement is a reasonable probability.
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be imposed on the secured creditor were he to dispose of repossessed
collateral pursuant to the disposition provisions of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code-commercial reasonableness. 36 Judge Cyr
incorporated this standard in his determination that an "ongoing-busi-
ness" valuation standard should be used:
There can be no question but that the debtors' inventory, accounts re-
ceivable, equipment and other chattel collateral can be converted into
cash in the orderly course of its business at prices ranging from 30% to
80% above forced sale recovery levels.
A forced sale in these circumstances could not be considered com-
mercially reasonable ...
It is little more than the articulation of an unexceptionable business
judgment to hold that, wherever practicable, conversion in the ordinary
course of business should be considered the most commercially reason-
able collateral disposition, simply because and to the extent that it is
more productive. Where collateral includes inventory and receivables
the distinction can be of enormous significance. While its business is
operating, a Chapter XI debtor can continue to convert receivables at
face value and sell inventory at market. Once business operations
cease, receivables and inventory will return only a disappointing fraction
of their value, particularly if they have to be liquidated in ordinary bank-
ruptcy proceedings. It would be inept to ignore and prodigal to decline
that collateral margin in the rehabilitation process.'3
Thus, courts have used a "going-concern" basis in valuing floating
lien collateral for this purpose. In the reported cases the courts have
determined on this basis that the secured creditor involved was fully
secured, so that no invasion of its property rights was effected by the
operation of the debtor's business or the continuance of the chapter
XI stay order.138  In both American Kitchen Foods and Citicorp
Business Credit, Inc. v. Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc.13 9 the courts de-
termined that the value of the secured creditor's collateral was sub-
stantially in excess of the amount of the debt claimed. 40  As a result,
the monitoring protection described above was less important than it
would have been if the collateral had been valued at less than the
claimed debt. When, however, a valuation of the collateral indicates
that the floating lien creditor is only partially secured, the monitoring
device employed by the courts should determine whether the collateral
is being impaired by continued operation, requiring relief from the
rule 11-44 stay.
136. U.C.C. § 9-504 (1972 version).
137. Chemical Bank v. American Kitchen Foods, Inc. (In re American Kitchen Foods,
Inc.), 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 715, 721-22 (D. Me. 1976).
138. For a discussion of the impact of this finding, see text accompanying notes 29-37
supra.
139. See note 101 supra.
140. The court in Blazon also noted that even if the valuation were halved (presumably
to take into consideration forced sale losses), the secured creditor would have been fully se-
cured.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, it is obvious that a chapter XI proceeding will have a
significant impact upon secured creditors even though the plan of
arrangement cannot modify or alter their rights. Quick and correct
action by the attorney for a secured creditor in responding to or antici-
pating a chapter XI filing is essential to properly protect secured
creditors' interests. Probably the most important function of the
attorney for a mortgagee is to anticipate a chapter XI filing, and to get
his foreclosure filed and receiver appointed before the chapter XI
filing so that the receiver can continue in possession during the
chapter XI proceeding. Thereafter, the attorney should file and pur-
sue a complaint to vacate the rule 11-44 stay order so that his fore-
closure action or other enforcement remedy may be continued or com-
menced.
In connection with floating liens on accounts receivable and in-
ventory, the attorney for the secured creditor must immediately review
the order granting a debtor the right to continue in possession and
operate its business in order to determine whether his client's collateral
is being dissipated through the continued operation of the business.
If adequate safeguards have not been included, he must take im-
mediate steps to see that they are so included. If adequate safeguards
have been included, he must then look to the value of the collateral,
the probability of success of a plan, and other possible detriments
to his client from the continuation of the stay. Having examined all
these factors, he should be in a position to ensure that the secured
creditor is not "materially and adversely affected" by a chapter XI
case.
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